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The Human Interoperability (HI) initiative is intended to improve the responsiveness, efficiency, 
and effectiveness of organizations when they partner externally or internally. This capability 
should improve the ability of organizations to execute missions across the continuum from 
normal and routine (such as Maritime Domain Awareness and maintaining port security) to 
national crises (such as major terrorist attacks).  
 
Human Interoperability research beginning in FY 08 and continuing in future years will produce 
three products: (1) a structured, multi-disciplinary method for studying inter- and intra-
organization collaboration at the operational level, and a taxonomy of barriers and solution 
strategies; (2) a specification of barriers to Human Interoperability in DoD and its partners; and 
(3) tools for organization designers and leaders: case studies, guidelines, measures, and models 
that support partnership planning. 
 
This document reports findings from initial research, led by OSD NII, to explore the discipline 
and dimensions of HI. The goals of the research team were to develop theory concerning HI, 
capture and analyze initial evidence of barriers to organizational collaboration, and to outline 
objectives for future research.  
 
The team’s initial approach to a theoretical framework of human interoperability between large 
organizations and organizational partnerships focused on organizations as complex systems. In 
this view, organizations shape, and are shaped bi-directionally, by their environments. 
Organizations employ a catalog of structures (personal relationships, liaisons, joint task forces, 
information sharing and systems, etc.) through 
which they coordinate and execute work, and 
trade valued products, such as information. 
Several mechanisms – policy, processes, 
cultural factors, information systems, and 
individual competency – modulate the type, 
method, speed, volume, and quality of activity 
over these structures. Astute organizations adapt 
structures and control mechanisms over time. 
They cannot reliably do this by choosing 
between structures and controls that are 
engineered into the organization a priori, 
because organizations typically are not designed 
for adaptation, nor would they be efficient or effective on any given mission if they were crafted 
to satisfy all possible future missions. Rather, the complex systems view leads us to postulate 
that organizations, like their individual members, develop an adaptive competence to form, use, 
and evolve structures and controls that improve inter- and intra-organizational performance. The 
nature of these competencies is a focus of proposed research, as is the catalog of structures and 
controls that organizations develop. 
 
The first experimental HI event, HI 08, took place in June 2008. OSD NII assembled a research 
team to conduct this initial investigation of Human Interoperability issues. The team executed its 
Operating Environment







study during Trident Warrior 08 (TW 08, a NAVNETWARCOM sponsored field experiment) in 
June 2008.  The data collected in interviews informed our understanding of many of the 
structures and controllers referenced above. We present a summary of these findings and of their 
implications for the design and conduct of organizational partnerships on page 18 in Table 1. 
 
We recommend that a program of research be developed to significantly deepen and broaden our 
understanding of Human Interoperability barriers and solutions for DoD organizations. This 
work will produce refined methods for studying this and other complex fields of human 
interaction, and it will lay the foundation on which to develop products for training and aiding 
leaders as they develop partnerships that strengthen their organizations and accomplish missions. 
Critical to that research is the definition of objectives and questions it must address. We have 
drafted those products, and describe how they can be put to use on page 21. 
  
The authors welcome comments and recommendations concerning this work. Please contact Dr. 




Human Interoperability: Its Function, Form, and Future 
 
The Human Interoperability (HI) research initiative is intended to improve performance within 
organizations and between them. More specifically, HI research is intended to improve the 
responsiveness, efficiency, and effectiveness of organizations that must partner or dynamically 
integrate elements of their organization (people, processes, resources, authorities, 
responsibilities) with those of others in periods of unique and possibly disorienting need. This  
improved adaptability of organizations is theorized to also increase their ability to execute 
missions across the continuum from normal and routine (such as Maritime Domain Awareness 
and maintaining port security) to national crises (such as major terrorist attacks).  
 
Barriers to effective cross-organization collaboration are increasingly a subject of concern as 
DoD and its partners attempt to coordinate activity at multiple levels during unique operations 
that bring together new combinations of organizations to address a broad spectrum of needs. This 
is precisely the challenge facing the Department of Homeland Security; DHS has struggled and 
sometimes failed to integrate its seven operational units1 (Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen, 2006). 
The HI research initiative attempts to (1) to develop a structured, multi-disciplinary approach to 
analyzing collaboration, co-operation, and coordination success and failures at the operational 
level; (2) identify and categorize barriers to these activities; (3) and design, develop, and test 
solutions that overcome these barriers. To accomplish this, the HI initiative must develop theory, 
experimental methods, measures, and experiments that grow knowledge of human 
interoperability, as well as products of direct benefit to organizations: dynamic models to support 
HI diagnosis and design, guidance to leaders, exemplars that motivate improvement.  
 
In somewhat greater detail, the HI research team aims to develop: 
• Experimentation -- Conduct an initial study, piggybacking the resources of Trident 
Warrior '08, that surfaces barriers to HI. Conduct more structured and rigorous 
experiments beginning in FY09. 
• Methodology -- Define an efficient and productive method for studying HI in 
experiments.  
• Theory -- Define a theory that enumerates the types of human interfaces and protocols 
that enable effective collaboration between organizations.  Test and refine this theory 
through experimentation. 
• Measures -- Define measures of human interoperability between enterprises, and of the 
effectiveness of interfaces that support interoperability.  
• Exemplars – Identify, foster, and publicize examples of HI, organizational interfaces that 
the community can inspect and replicate to improve the enterprise. 
                                                 
1 The operational entities within DHS are Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Immigrations Customs Enforcement, U.S. Secret 
Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Coast Guard. 
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• Management resources – Develop guidance that helps leaders efficiently, reliably, and 
measurably improve HI. This guidance will be identified through sensitivity analyses 
conducted using the modeling technology, above. 
• Organizational design resources – Apply systems engineering principles to define design 
elements – structures, processes, training, etc. – that increase the potential for human 
interoperability. 
• Model – Define formal models of HI that support reliable diagnosis of causes of failures 
of HI and prediction of intended and unintended effects of actions to improve HI. 
Implement this model in a software tool that aids leaders of organizations, as well as 
researchers who must test new hypotheses about HI and methods of managing it.  
 
The first HI experimentation, HI08, took place in June 2008. OSD NII assembled a research 
team to conduct this initial investigation, under the direction of Stefania Brown-VanHoozer, 
Ph.D. The team executed its study during Trident Warrior 08 (TW 08), a field experiment 
sponsored by NAVNETWARCOM.  Data collection in HI08 focused on three dimensions of HI: 
(1) human infrastructures (personal relationships, liaisons, joint centers, etc.) that people 
establish to coordinate their work with other humans – person-to-person, person-to-
organizations, person (s) to systems;  
(2) factors that control the volume and quality of work executed through this infrastructure, 
e.g., policy, processes, social-cultural nuances, cognitive issues, human interaction with 
information systems, authoritative lanes, and other factors of human interactions;  
(3) sharing of information 
 
Findings from that effort are reported here, as are recommendations concerning future HI 
experimentation. We begin, however, by presenting a draft theory of HI to help the reader 
understand the orientation of this effort and the structure of the analyses reported below.  
 
Toward a theory of Human Interoperability  
This section of the report presents a draft theory of Human Interoperability. The theory serves 
several functions. First, it clarifies what we mean when we talk about Human Interoperability. 
Second, it familiarizes the reader with the structure used to categorize and analyze findings from 
HI08 (below). Third, the theory provides the research team with considerable leverage on the 
problem of defining research objectives for future Human Interoperability studies.  
 
A variety of research disciplines address questions concerning how organizations function. 
Organizational psychology explores characteristics of team members and team interactions that 
predict effectiveness. Systems engineering methods such as the DoD Architectural Framework 
(Department of Defense, 2007) specify operational aspects of socio-technical systems ( “OV” 
diagrams of organization function, connectivity, information dependencies, roles and 
relationships, activities, and states), technical aspects of these system (“SV” diagrams of entity 
interfaces, functions, activities, performance parameters, technologies, information formats, and 
others), and standards employed by the system (“TV” diagrams). Cultural research defines 
attributes of culture (e.g., power distance, individualism, etc.) that differ reliably between 
national or ethnic groups and that can help predict attitudes and behaviors (For a concise review 
of these literatures, see Appendix A: Literature Review).  
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None of these approaches provides the diagnostic or predictive power needed to understand and 
shape interactions within and between organizations at the operational level. It is at this level that 
organizations systematically create, use, and evolve internal and external partnerships. In 
particular, the system engineering methods on which DoD heavily relies (e.g., the DoD 
Architectural Framework, 2007) were not designed to define how humans within organizations 
interact; they were not designed to model highly adaptive organizational structures and 
processes; and they are typically applied to model the integration of entities within one 
organization, not the actual or potential interoperability between organizations. In short, existing 
engineering solutions represent single, static, organizations, and not human activity within 
organizations that collaborate dynamically and opportunistically.  
 
Interactions at the human-human interface are, however, of increasing concern as the scope and 
complexity of missions grows – from warfighting to hybrid missions involving peacekeeping, 
political change, humanitarian assistance, nation building, infrastructure restitution, law 
enforcement,  and other activities. In these cases, units within organizations and organizations 
themselves often must ally and collaborate in new ways to define and resolve problems. Further, 
these complex collaborations often must create or extend a capability for sharing information in 
order to achieve the close coupling and synchronization that missions demand. 
 
However, it is often difficult for units and organizations to join forces, despite ubiquitous 
information sharing technologies (e.g., web browsers, common databases, teleconferencing, chat, 
email). Barriers of several types often afflict the effectiveness and efficiency with which 
organizational entities interact.  
• Policy barriers may prevent institutions from collaborating effectively. For example, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often have policies that prohibit interaction with 
DoD, even when DoD offers material aid of high value to NGO missions. Legal barriers 
(e.g., the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996) prohibit health 
care providers from sharing certain information about patients, and the Posse Comitatus 
Act (1878) prohibits DoD from participating in police actions on U.S. soil.  
• Structural barriers may effectively disable the very interfaces through which interaction 
should occur. For example, an element of one organization may have no corresponding or 
effective element in another organization.  
• Process barriers occur when there are no procedures for sharing information, decisions, 
and tasks across organizations, or when the procedures of one organization are obscure or 
even infeasible (e.g., with respect to security) for another.  
• Data interoperability barriers exist when the information products of one institution 
have no relationship to the information input requirements of another, when systems with 
potential information value cannot be used by a given organization, or when the language 
used in one organization is ambiguous or conflicts with the language used at another.  
• Cultural barriers exist when authority, reward structures, tolerance for uncertainty, time 
orientation, and other constructs (Hofstede, 1980, 1994) are in conflict. For example, the 
military command hierarchy often is seen as in conflict with the relatively flat and 
adaptive (or flexible) authority structures of law enforcement and civilian organizations. 
• Cognitive and affective barriers exist when an individual cannot effectively support 
collaboration between organizations because they do not have the knowledge and skills to 
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do so, or when they fail to develop trust2 and other requirements of relationships 
efficiently and effectively.  
 
The length of this list may give the reader some sense of the complexity of HI. Existing 
approaches to the analysis and design of organizations (see Appendix A: Literature Review) do 
not address many of these aspects of complexity, nor do they confront this fact: organizations 
evolve with their missions, their interactions with other organizations, and the initiatives and 
ambitions of their members. Recent literature addresses these issues of evolution in part by 
viewing organizations as complex systems. Marion and Uhl-Bien (2002) approach organizations 
as networks of agents seeking to fulfill their individual and collective requirements. While this 
approach allows for the creation of intentionally designed organizations, it also accounts for 
spontaneous emergence of organizations and partnerships, and for behaviors in organizations that 
reflect local requirements (and even may conflict with global, organizational requirements). The 
theory accounts for the dynamic response of organizations in complex and uncertain 
environments given their state.  
 
In practice, organizational adaptation is often slow, difficult, and somewhat unpredictable. Thus, 
adaptation often cannot be completed rapidly enough for time critical missions, nor can leaders 
have confidence that adaptation will improve execution. These problems have been found in 
laboratory experiments, as well as real world observational studies. Human-team-in-the-loop 
experiments showed that organizations can adapt their structure (Entin, Weil, Kleinman, 
Hutchins, Hocevar, Kemple, and Serfaty, 2004) to fit mission demands. However, the effort 
required to shift form is great, and thus the probability of successful adaptation is low. Further, 
the amount of effort required to change structure varies with the current, structural state of the 
organization. In experimental studies of military command and control (C2), organizations adapt 
more readily from divisional forms (in which members control assets in different regions) to 
functional forms (in which members control assets of different types), and they adapt less readily 
from functional to divisional structure (Moon, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, West, Ellis, Humphrey, Porter, 
2000). This phenomenon is interpreted in system dynamics terms as hysteresis, a pattern in 
which change (or phase transition) is dependent on history. Relatively little is known about how 
to facilitate (or even measure) adaptation between organizational states. In short, it is difficult to 
change an organization’s structure and process, often unpredictably so, and the source of 
difficulty is not well understood. 
 
The perspective that organizations are complex or dynamical systems is not an argument that 
they are inherently suboptimal, unstable, or uncontrollable. There is ample evidence (Levchuk, 
Meirina, Pattipati, and Kleinman, 2004) that organizations can be designed to fit a mission or 
environment well. However, it tests credulity to propose that an organization could be designed, 
a priori, to be optimally effective and robust to all possible adaptations. Mission-specific 
effectiveness and general robustness typically must be traded off against one another. Nor is it 
feasible to design an organization with all of the interfaces it might ever need to interoperate with 
potential partners and to conform to new environments.  No design or rules is likely to 
successfully address the infinite, or at least surprising, variety of future conditions.  
 
                                                 
2 We define trust here as confidence in the intentions and capability of a partner to act in accordance with one’s  
interests and plans. 
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By taking a complex systems perspective on this problem, we are able to propose instead that 
organizations acquire and exercise a competency to adapt3. This competency should enable 
organizations to invent or apply structures and processes that are well-suited to new missions, 
particularly when those missions take place in a highly unstable and environment (see Figure 1, 
from Daft, 2000).  
 
Low Uncertainty
1.  Mechanistic structure; formal,
centralized
2.  Few departments
3.  No integrating roles
4.  Current operations orientation
High-Moderate Uncertainty
1.  Organic structure, teamwork;
participative, decentralized
2.  Few departments, much boundary
spanning
3.  Few integrating roles
4.  Planning  orientation
High Uncertainty
1.  Organic structure, teamwork;
participative, decentralized
2.  Many departments differentiated,
extensive boundary spanning
3.  Many integrating roles
4.  Extensive planning, forecasting
Low-Moderate Uncertainty
1.  Mechanistic structure; formal,
centralized
2.  Many departments, some boundary
spanning
3.  Few integrating roles









High value of adaptive competence
under unstable conditions
High value of HIE  
Figure 1: Organizations require an organic competency to adapt in unstable and complex 
environments. 
 
We propose an initial theory of HI that specifies some of the competencies that may enable an 
organization to evolve its structure and control mechanisms to better fit environmental demands. 
Figure 2 illustrates this framework.  
 
 
                                                 









Adaptive Competency  
Figure 2: Adaptive competency enables an organization to adapt its structure and control 
mechanisms to the environment.  
 
HI08 identified a number of structures through which organizational units and organizations 
interact (see Figure 3). These include personal relationships, formal liaisons, joint operation 
centers, trusted third party organizations that enable each organization to pass information 
securely, and information systems. The order of structures also reflects declining flexibility, from 
individual relationships that operate quite adaptively, to units whose policies and procedures may 
constrain interactions, to information systems that efficiently pass only the information they are 
designed to handle.  
 
A variety of mechanisms, or controllers, modulate the volume, rate, and quality of activity that 
occurs through these structures. These include (see Figure 3): 
○ Organizational policy, such as objectives and rewards for achieving interoperability or 
goals that require it; 
○ Procedures that may support or restrict interoperability; 
○ Culture, which specifies customs, attitudes, and values that bear on collaboration; 
○ Cognitive competencies that enable individuals to execute taskwork and teamwork 
necessary for interoperability; and 
○ Data interoperability, which enables or hinders exchange of information. 
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z Policy constraints / disincentives
z Procedural inhibitors
z Cultural mismatches 
z Incompetent personnel
z Data exchange barriers
Person (Org A) Person (Org B)
Person (Org B) Person (Org A)
No Relationship
 
Figure 3: Structural forms and sources of impedance in organizational collaboration 
 
As Figure 4 illustrates, organizational structure and controls are dynamic. Here time is laid on 
the vertical axis to illustrate an evolution of structures between organizations from personal 
relationships to a liaison, and then a joint center (such as the Joint Terrorism Task Force, which 
hosts FBI, NCIS, local law enforcement, and a variety of Federal agencies) and an information 
system that automates information transfer and governs it through business rules. We argue that 
organizations with high adaptive competence choose the best structure for the mission, and 
interviews in HI08 indicate that some organizations do systematically manage the evolution of 
structural forms, typically developing personal relationships into formal structures. The literature 








Person (Org A) Person (Org B)




Figure 4: An example of structural evolution in response to operational need.  
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What are the competencies that enable organizations to adapt well to the environment? The 
competencies must include the following: 
• Detection: A capability to detect and analyze the need for change, whether imposed top-
down in the form of a new objective or mission, or arising from the bottom up in the form 
of unexpected opportunities to accomplish missions.  
• Selection: A capability to select from experience or generate organizational structures 
and control mechanisms. 
• Evaluation: A capability to think critically about the first- and higher-order effects of 
employing these structures and controls on the organization, its partner, other 
stakeholders, and the environment. 
 
Recent research demonstrates that these characteristics enable organizations to adapt at least their 
procedures to successfully address novel or unexpected problems. Burke, et al. (1999) found that 
teams adapted more successfully when their leaders provided teams with situational awareness, 
made adaptation triggers explicit, and provided a rationale for adaptation. This is evidence of the 
need for a detection capability. Horn and Zaccaro (under review) provided evidence that team 
leaders (and presumably their teams) adapted more successfully if they had more varied 
experience on which to draw, evidence of a selection capability. Finally, Marks, Zaccaro, and 
Mathieu (2000) found that teams adapted better when they were trained to critique solutions 
from multiple viewpoints, evidence of the need for an evaluation capability.  
 
We speculate that adaptive organizations will show greater evidence of these competencies than 
will non-adaptive organizations, and that selecting leaders or training members in these 
competencies may increase adaptivity. Such training and development might help organizations 
to ask and answer the questions as: 
• Detection: Is there a collaboration or partnership that will dramatically increase our 
likelihood of success in this mission? What does the partner bring to this mission? What 
do I bring to this mission? 
• Selection: How can we structure and manage collaboration so that we apply resources 
efficiently, synchronize action, maintain SA, and exploit opportunities to adapt further? 
• Evaluation: How will the proposed structure and control system influence other aspects 
of this organization? How will other stakeholders respond to this partnership and its 
actions? Are collaborations and partnerships that are forged sustainable? Are they 
flexible should the environment change? 
 
Adaptive competency may be applied in long term planning exercises, and this may help ensure 
smooth, relatively rapid, and successful development of partnerships. When it must be applied to 
emergent, high tempo missions, however, adaptive competency may be insufficient. Some 
organizational infrastructure and control mechanisms may also be necessary to adapt at speed. 
Assume that a new liaison relationship is required immediately for an emergent mission. The 
organization will implement this relationship better and faster if it has facilities, information 
system accounts, and training for incoming liaisons at the ready at all times. 
 
In sum, this draft theory of HI focuses our attention and effort on three elements: organizational 
structure, control mechanisms, and adaptive competency. The challenge ahead of us is to define 
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experimental conditions that reveal and exercise these elements, to specify measures with which 
to compare the state of elements and their impact on mission outcomes, to design methods that 
enable organizations to acquire the competency to adapt, and to develop techniques that enable 
them assess tradeoffs and forecast effects of adaptation.  
Research: HI08 
HI08 studied the interactions between organizations conducting Maritime Domain Awareness 
Scenarios within TW08. Data were collected in interviews in the first week of HI08 (HI08.1), 
with law enforcement and military intelligence. Data were collected in interviews during the 
second week of HI08 (HI08.2) from DoD organizations tasked with defense responsibilities.  
 
Below, we describe the objectives, participants, procedures, findings, and recommendations from 
this, initial experiment. 
Objectives 
The overarching objective of HI08 was to identify enablers of and constraints on Human 
Interoperability. This entailed identifying and examining interactions at several levels: human-
human (communication and behavior), human-system, human-organization, and organization-
organization. More specifically, data collection focused on several aspects of organizations that 
we hypothesized would enable or constrain human interoperability: 
1. Intra- and inter-organizational structures that support collaboration, cooperation (sharing 
of behaviors) and coordination; 
2. Processes that support collaboration, cooperation and coordination; 
3. Social, cultural, and cognitive factors that influence inter-organizational collaboration, 
cooperation (especially) and coordination by the various organizations; 
4. Policies/doctrine concerning information sharing & cooperation and coordination of 
activities; and 
5. Attributes of information systems that enable or encumber collaboration, cooperation or 
coordination. 
 
This research effort did not investigate the role of individual competency in organizational 
adaptation, nor did it examine environmental constraints on and affordances for adaptation. 
(Both are components of the framework defined above).  Information systems themselves were 
not a focus of HI08, but we have captured, below, some general concerns about the usability, 
utility, socialization, and policies surrounding new technologies.  
Participants 
The interviewees for data collection in HI08.1 were drawn from the Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service (NCIS), the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the British Royal Navy, and the New Zealand 
Navy. In addition, data were collected in an observation of a video teleconference (VTC) 
between these organizations and the Multiple Threats Alert Center. These individuals were 
concurrently participating in the Trident Warrior exercise to test technologies for supporting 
collaboration (only) between Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) field offices, Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and Naval intelligence.   
 
The interviewees in HI08.2 were from Third Fleet Joint Forces Maritime Component 
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Command (JFMCC), the Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the Pacific Fleet Maritime 
Operations Center (PACFLEET MOC), Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping 
(NCAGS), and the Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West).  These individuals were 
concurrently participating in the Trident Warrior experiment to test a variety of technologies4 
(see Appendix B: Trident Warrior Technologies in HI08.1). 
 
Data collection was directed by Stefania Brown-VanHoozer, Ph.D. (OSD NII) and Shelley 
Gallup, Ph.D., NPS. Data collection was conducted by Jared Freeman, Ph.D., Aptima; Randall 
Murch, Ph.D., Virginia Tech; Tami Smith, from the office of the Deputy Undersecretary of the 
Navy; and Hal Moore, NORTHCOM. Art Glynn, NORTHCOM and Jeff Chilton, DHS, 
contributed to the data collection plans. Interviewees were obtained by the Trident Warrior lead 




Most interviews were conducted by two or more members of the HI research team with one 
interviewee. In some cases, small group interviews were conducted. The interviews were 
informal, but in most cases addressed all of the barrier issues identified above. Representative 
questions from these interviews were:  
1. Tell us about a case in which your organization encountered challenges collaborating 
with another organization to accomplish your mission. 
2. What structure – liaisons, working groups, or other entities – enabled your organization 
to collaborate with other organizations? 
3. How (by what processes) did you execute your work? 
4. What made this collaboration challenging? 
5. Were there differences in the culture of these organizations that you had to address? 
6. Were there policies that enabled or prevented you from collaborating? 
Findings 
Findings from HI08 interviews are organized, below, into observations concerning 
organizational structure, process, culture, policy, and human-system/program interactions. 
Recommendations related to these findings are presented in a subsequent chapter of this report. 
Structures for collaboration between organizations 
Interviews conducted in HI08 investigated the range of structures that organizations use to 
facilitate collaboration, coordination and cooperation; and the benefits of these structures. The 
informants represented NCIS, the British Royal Navy Fleet Intelligence, the New Zealand Navy 
liaison to the National Maritime Coordination Center, the Maritime Threat Analysis Center 
(MTAC), and non-governmental organizations. 
 
                                                 
4 These TW08 technologies spanned these domains: command and control, coalition, distance support, fires, human 
systems integration, information operations, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), knowledge 
management, networking, Sea Shield, wireless information transport, and cross domain solutions. 
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1) Organizational structures vary; their relationship to collaboration requirements needs 
to be determined 
A variety of individual and organizational structures support collaboration and cooperation 
between organizations. Examples were found of personal trust relationships, liaisons, joint task 
forces, third party intermediaries, and information systems that pass data using mutually 
agreeable business rules. The structures have different strengths, according to the interviewees: 
an NCIS representative to the JTTF, the British Royal Navy Fleet Intelligence, a New Zealand 
Navy liaison to the National Maritime Coordination Center, members of the Maritime Threat 
Analysis Center (MTAC), and a specialist in non-governmental organizations. More research is 
required to fully map out the utility that organizations perceive and receive from different 
organizational forms in various mission contexts.  
 
2) Collaboration and cooperation between law enforcement organizations depends heavily 
on personal relationships with trusted partners.   
The centrality and sensitivity of personal trust relationships to law enforcement was emphasized 
in most interviews. These relationships are built informally through repeated exchanges of 
information that may deliberately hide or credit the source organization, as the case requires. 
Information exchange can be conducted without a strong foundation of trust; however distrust 
can rapidly build barriers that make exchange of information much more difficult. As noted 
below, security procedures substituted for personal trust between military organizations in 
exchange of information.  
 
3) Co-location is a strong factor in effective collaboration and cooperation.  
Though communication technologies make it relatively simple to create distributed teams that 
are physically located within their organizations, co-location is widely used. Several examples 
were found of creating liaisons within partner organizations, and of gathering representatives to 
create a new entity such as a joint task force or working group. These strategies may enable 
collaboration to occur more opportunistically, ensure coordination, and simplify access to the 
information and resources of the participating organizations. For example, in the JTTF, the local 
contacts of the police department complement the information resources and technical 
capabilities of Federal agencies. NCIS, the New Zealand Navy, and many other institutions use 
this strategy when they co-locate liaisons at the operation sites of key stakeholders and provide 
civilian entities with the opportunity to task military ISR assets. The JTTF in Hawaii uses this 
strategy by co-locating representatives of the FBI, NCIS, CIA, NSA, several Hawaii police 
departments, the FAA Air Marshals, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Coast Guard, the 
U.S. Marshal’s Service, Secret Service, and other entities. This “inner circle” of agencies 
expands to routinely include the U.S. Attorney, Army, National Guard, and others as needed. 
The number of participants provides backup should any one entity be unable to execute a 
mission, though presents a cost in administrative overhead. JIATF West, similarly co-locates 
U.S. representatives in operating centers of international partners to provide the training and 
guidance that may dramatically increase partner effectiveness, accomplish U.S. goals such as 
controlling drug traffic in the countries of origin (not just on American soil), and build strong 
relationships for future missions.  JIATF-W is currently transitioning from tactical to operational 
missions that require deeper understanding of policies and doctrine for international interaction. 
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One of many possible concerns about creating liaisons is that these assignments can hamper 
career progression, a disincentive to those who fill these posts. 
 
4) Collaborating through a third organization anonymizes exchanges of sensitive 
information.  
Collaborating through a third party potentially enables agencies to share sensitive information 
while concealing sources or methods. The United Kingdom employs this strategy to pass 
information between military intelligence and the police by interposing the National Ports 
Analysis center between entities in the UK, the Mediterranean, Balkans and Horn of Africa. This 
entity currently relays information pertinent to criminal investigations between intelligence and 
law enforcement, and in the future may relay information pertinent to organized crime and 
terrorist activity. Intermediary organizations can be stood up temporarily, as is the case for the 
Crisis Action Center (CAC) of MTAC. The CAC stands up to manage information flow from 
NCIS, with the concurrence of the MTAC director in response to MOTR calls and in other cases 
of emergency.  This type of collaboration provides a means to limit and/or deny cooperation. 
 
5) Current information systems support efficient, though inflexible, distributed 
collaboration.  
Information systems potentially enable participants in different locations, with limited personnel 
resources, to interoperate through embedded collaboration technologies. NGOs use this strategy 
in humanitarian crises. In response to the hurricane in Burma, NGOs organized into functional 
clusters5 and shared information in part through websites. However, information systems built to 
benefit the enterprise sometimes do not have value to local units, and so those technologies are 
neither welcomed nor used.  
 
6) Structures that link partners consist of substructures that are sometimes antagonistic 
or incongruent.  
A given organization may develop a complex network of organizational relationships, some 
multilateral (involving information flow among a set of partners), some bilateral (involving 
information flow that is exclusive to a pair of organizations). Two competing or conflicting 
organizations (e.g., two law enforcement agencies) may both fall within such a network, and in 
this case the constraints on sharing information must be defined explicitly so that the 
organizations are confident that their information and interests are secure.  
 
These findings bear on the variety of HI structures to investigate in future experiments. 
Processes for collaboration between organizations 
Interviews conducted during HI08.1 elicited insights concerning the processes agencies use to 
facilitate inter-agency collaborations. The interviewees represented NCIS at JTTF, the New 
Zealand Navy position within that nation’s National Maritime Coordination Center, British 
Royal Navy Fleet Intelligence, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (a Navy 
organization that provides advice for safe passage of merchant ships worldwide), JIATF West, 
                                                 
5 NGOs typically avoid engaging with U.S. government or military in crises in countries opposed to the U.S. Such 
engagement would make NGO personnel targets of attack for their alliance with the U.S. 
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and Third Fleet JFMCC. Both informants have experience facilitating collaboration between 
military and law enforcement entities.  
 
7) Effective inter-agency relations are built on exchanges of valued assets.  
A key step in establishing new relationships is to identify assets that potential partners value and 
that the can (by policy or law) trade. For example: 
• The first step that JIATF West takes in developing new partnerships with law 
enforcement entities in Southeast Asia is to contact the country team, especially 
representatives in country, to learn what US information or support has value to the 
prospective partner: training, transportation, information resources, etc. With that 
knowledge, JIATF can assess U.S. capability to provide that information or support, and 
assign a program manager to pool resources across U.S. organizations and kick off a 
relationship through exercises and provision of support services. 
• Local entities – such as airport authorities and port authorities – provide valued 
information concerning their infrastructure, processes, activities, assets, and 
vulnerabilities to Federal law enforcement authorities in exchange for information, 
services (e.g., accelerating a procedure), or materiel (e.g., access to technology).  
• In the international arena, the New Zealand Navy’s military liaison to the New Zealand 
National Maritime Coordination Center provides the civilian members with training to 
improve human resources, and it provides up to 450 hours of military ISR support. The 
New Zealand Navy, in return, receives the support of specialized personnel for boardings, 
certain civilian training, and access to an open source COP that is in some ways superior 
to their classified COP. At a political level, the involvement of the New Zealand Navy in 
the growing civilian missions of the NMCC gives the Navy a rationale to request 
increases in its budget in support of commercial security. 
• Third Fleet JFMCC has built working relations with a large number of organizations. At 
the heart of each relationship is an exchange of valued information. For example, JFMCC 
helps Pacific island nations maintain a shared watch list of vessels; JFMCC trades 
information about the presence of vessels from superpowers with TRANSCOM; Customs 
and Border Patrol provides cargo data to JFMCC, which in return recommends vessels 
for boarding.  
 
8) Information exchange costs can encumber collaboration.  
A variety of other factors can hinder information flow between groups, including cumbersome 
processes and physical barriers. Processes designed to protect information – information 
declassification and requirements to move information through trusted sources – increase the 
cost of doing business, lower the efficiency of collaboration, and can decrease trust between 
organizations. Some mechanisms do exist to address this problem, including the Intelligence 
Information Sharing Dispute Resolution (to be issued as Intelligence Community Policy 
Memorandum 501-3), and Executive Order 12333. Physical barriers can have similar effects, as 
we heard in complaints about the recent sealing of a door between PACFLEET MOC and the 
JIOCC. The value of such security measures should be carefully weighed against the costs. 
 
9) Intra and/or Inter-organizational partnerships can grow from opportunity or mandate 
(bottom-up or top-down).  
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Organizations use a range of methods to discover or develop potential partnerships. Some 
approaches are driven from the bottom up, by opportunity. For example, Third Fleet JFMCC 
recruits partners in part through personal contacts made at exercises, at conferences, cross-
briefings, in working groups and in other venues. These partnerships then develop as a function 
of mutual benefit or need. Organizations may partner by mandate, or top down. For example, 
JTTF was formed through a strategic national initiative to combat terrorism.  
 
10) Organizations institutionalize personal trust relationships.  
By transforming productive, personal relationships into institutional alliances, organizations 
ensure that intra and inter-organizational ties survive the inevitable transfers and retirement of 
individual relationship holders.  For example: 
• An FBI field office has sustained its relationship to municipal police by inviting them to 
quarterly firearms re-certifications (target practice), followed by a cookout. Police 
departments were invited to take the spare ammunition for their own training events. This 
recurring interaction between officers helps to build and sustain personal trust 
relationships that are important in solving criminal cases. 
• A British intelligence officer codifies his personal relationships between civilian entities 
and his military organization by (1) identifying a trusted organization that can serve as an 
intermediary between information sources and information consumers, and (2) 
developing procedures that enable the intermediary to conceal the information source and 
the originator’s methods, and transfer it in a reliable, timely, and secure manner to the 
consumer.  
 
11) Organizations seek to learn the capabilities and constraints of others, and educate 
others about their own capabilities.  
Organizations extend their knowledge of the capabilities of others, and may learn from them, by 
participating in exercises and by participating in the training at other organizations. NCAGS, for 
example, has learned some exemplary watch processes from Canadians in exercises, and 
participates in British training concerning managing and monitoring commercial shipping. The 
JTTF, seeks to convey its joint capabilities to new staff during increasingly structured and 
comprehensive in-briefs. JTTF also involves a variety of its members in operations specifically 
to expose them to each others capabilities.  
 
12) Organizations require procedures for triggering and managing collaboration.  
Procedures to facilitate collaboration are not always in place, or at least not in play. This was the 
case in parts of in HI08.1. For example, participants at NCIS had some difficulty determining 
when to reach out to (other) field offices. Participants had no apparent process for defining a lead 
entity, a “command and control” node for an investigation that crossed venues. Second, a video 
teleconference between MTAC (in DC) and representatives (in Hawaii) of NCIS, Third Fleet 
MOC, and the New Zealand Navy was complex or confused on the topics of how and with 
whom to collaborate and coordinate across organizations, and what assets were available to 
accomplish the mission. The VTC participants did not reference any procedures for making these 
decisions more crisply and systematically. Explicit procedures for planning and coordinating 
joint operations are often needed to accomplish missions. 
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13) Venues are needed for testing work flow processes between military and non-military 
entities.  
The Maritime Domain Awareness mission requires interaction between military, law 
enforcement, and the vast international commercial shipping enterprise. However, current 
exercises focus largely on military collaborations within national military forces (e.g., Trident 
Warrior) or between national military forces (e.g., Rim of the Pacific Exercise, RIMPAC). These 
designs largely ignore or minimize the role of commercial shipping. In interviews, NCAGS 
leadership recommended exercises that engage commercial shipping at a realistic scale, and that 
address questions such as the following: 
• How can we pick a specific Vessel of Interest from other commercial or private vessels 
almost identical to it?  
• How do we communicate securely and confidentially with a single ship among tens or 
hundreds in an area? 
• How can we coordinate actions with a crowded field of internationally flagged white 
vessels in order to execute mission tasks, given the complexity of communications and 
the cost (to commercial interests) of compliance6? 
• How will the military address inevitable errors in its interactions with commercial 
carriers and white vessels, errors that may lead to lawsuits, future non-compliance, 
strained international relations, etc.? 
 
These findings have implications (presented below) concerning how to investigate processes in 
HI09. 
Culture in inter-organizational collaborations 
Interviews conducted during HI08.1 elicited insights concerning the role of culture in inter-
agency collaborations. The interviewees were an NCIS special agent at JTTF, a liaison from the 
New Zealand Navy to an information center concerned with commercial shipping, members of 
JIATFF West, and a member of the British Royal Navy Fleet Intelligence. Both informants have 
experience facilitating collaboration between military and law enforcement entities. 
 
14) Historical enmity between groups can foul interoperability 
Deeply ingrained prejudices between groups can complicate coordination, as one interviewee 
illustrated by describing conflicts between Greek and Turkish entities in the Sea Breeze 2007 
exercise. Greece and Turkey have a history of conflict stretching back to the entry of Turkish 
nomads to Greece in the 11th century, the subsequent dominancy of Ottomans over Greek, and 
the current stalemate over control of Cyprus.  
 
15) National cultures differ regarding the importance of rank.  
Members of JIATF-West noted cultural nuances such as the importance of rank may be more 
significant in Asia than the U.S. In discussions with potential Asian collaborators, JIATF-W 
found it is often important to ensure that the participants are peers in rank. This is consistent with 
the findings of Hofstede (1980). In some cases, this is less important in interactions between U.S. 
                                                 
6 NORTHCOM estimates that the cost of delay to commercial vessels is $10,000 per hour. 
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organizations, where depth of technical knowledge or decision authority may be the essential 
elements.  
 
These findings have implications concerning the aspects of organizational culture to investigate 
in HI09. 
Policy issues in inter-organizational collaboration 
Interviews conducted with representatives of JIATF West, NCIS, and NORTHCOM produced 
useful insights concerning the role of policy in inter-organization collaborations. 
 
16) Policies affecting information flows between organizations or across secure domains 
differ, and often conflict, between military and law enforcement entities.  
• Military organizations have formal policies governing the distribution of sensitive 
information. This formal process obviates the need for personal trust relationships (1) to 
move information quickly between organizational elements that do not share personal 
relationships, (2) when the trustworthiness of members is established a priori through 
security clearances, and (3) when personnel rotate frequently. However, it encumbers 
collaboration, and thus, cooperation, with some partners, including foreign military and 
domestic law enforcement (below). 
• Law enforcement entities often pass sensitive information primarily on the basis of trust, 
through interpersonal relationships with known individuals. The reliance on trust obviates 
the need for development of certain policies and procedures, works well when the 
organization must interact with other entities that lack such policies and procedures, and 
provides flexibility based on individual judgment about trustworthiness in context. We 
note, however, that information sharing in law enforcement will increasingly become 
subject to policy (business rules) as it is automated by information systems such as LInX 
(see Appendix B: Trident Warrior Technologies in HI08.1).  
 
17) Organizations differ on how proactive they are about refining policies.  
JIATF-West representatives take an assertive approach to resolving conflicts between mission 
requirements and policy. Specifically, JIATF West often pushes its recommendations for policy 
revisions up the chain of command. This strategy for controlling policies from the bottom up was 
not mentioned by other organizations.   
Information systems for collaboration between organizations 
Information systems designed to ensure and accelerate information flow sometimes present 
challenges to organizations and to inter-organizational collaboration, according to interviewees 
representing LInX, NCIS, the New Zealand and British Navies, JIATF West, NORTHCOM, 
JFMCC, and in related MDA research with NAVCENT.  
 
18) Information can be classified unintentionally; the cost of declassification to support 
collaboration can be high.  
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Information is sometimes classified simply by its passage onto restricted military networks and 
systems, though it may not warrant classification7 (per the categories specified in Executive 
Order 12958). The process of declassifying those data is manual, slow, and thus, rarely used. 
This makes it difficult to transfer important information from the military to law enforcement 
organizations, to coalition partners, and to others.  
 
19) Delivery of systems that local users cannot support (“drive by fielding”) diminishes 
return on technology investments.  
As interviewees at JIATF-West indicated information systems designed to serve the enterprise 
may lack local utility, and systems are sometimes discarded for that reason. More specifically, 
interviewees reported that technologies are sometimes pushed on their organizations though they 
do not have sufficient staff to use them, lack training that clarifies how to apply the technology to 
their specific mission, and find the systems to be extraordinarily difficult to use.  
 
20) Communities of interest can help unify users and standardize use.  
In the case of LInX, disparate policies about information sharing have developed in the different 
LInX regions. However, the LInX program has addressed this by creating regional steering 
committees that set policy, and an executive steering committee that attempts to standardize 
policy across regions. 
 
21) Information quality must be assured for user confidence.  
Information quality can vary greatly within a system. Users of LInX, for example, must often 
call the originating law enforcement office to interpret records, must deconflict coincidental 
relationships between records (e.g., the same name may be used for different suspects), and must 
correlate records that appear to differ but in fact concern the same individual (e.g., different 
name spellings or aliases may be used for the same suspect). Cost-effective methods of assuring 
information quality are needed. 
 
22) Information systems and systematic information handling create value and advertise 
expertise.  
Third Fleet JFMCC has used a home-grown information system to establish itself as an efficient 
broker of critical information about white shipping to military intelligence and operational 
forces. Specifically, JFMCC has developed technology that prioritizes vessels for action by 
partners at DoD and in law enforcement. The technology also enables JFMCC to turn around 
requests for information in minutes, rather than a day. Like the best information systems, this one 
effectively exposes and advertises the expertise of JFMCC (its categorization scheme and 
business rules) so that clients can inspect and negotiate JFMCC’s prioritization judgments about 
vessels, calibrate their trust in JFMCC, and act on its judgments.  
 
23) Information systems have hidden dependencies that can foil collaboration.  
Participants in the law enforcement component of TW08 (HI08.1) had some unexpected 
technical problems with collaboration technologies. These included lack of familiarity with 
                                                 
7 A NORTHCOM representative reports that 70% of all work executed on SIPRNET is unclassified. 
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required file types (e.g., the .pdf format for documents) or software to open them, and lack of 
connectivity (e.g., lack of unclassified data ports). More generally, systems have dependencies 
on user knowledge or certifications, operating environment, and mission that often are not made 
explicit, and thus present unwelcome surprises to users. 
 
These findings have implications concerning the interaction between information systems and 
the organizations they are designed to support. 
 
Discussion and Recommendations  
In this section, we draw implications from the findings above, and we leverage HI theory to 
specify objectives for future research. We refer to the next research events as HI09, in 
anticipation of the creation of an HI research program.  
 
Implications of HI08 research findings 
For each of the findings documented above, we have drawn one or more implications for leaders 
and managers of inter- and intra-organizational collaborations. These suggestions are 
preliminary. By that, we mean that they arise naturally from the interview findings of HI08, but 
they should be validated in a broader and deeper program of research concerning human 
interoperability. 
 
Table 1: Implications of HI08 research findings 
Factor Finding Implications 
Structure 1) Organizational structures 
vary; their relationship to 
collaboration requirements 
needs to be determined 
Support research into the form and function of 
structures for collaboration. Educate leaders 
concerning the effectiveness, costs, and benefits 
of these options. 
 2) Collaboration and 
cooperation between law 
enforcement organizations 
depends heavily on personal 
relationships with trusted 
partners. 
In partnering across professional domains (e.g., 
military to law enforcement), give preference to 
forms of partnership that are familiar to 
prospective collaborators (e.g., personal trust 
relationships for law enforcement). Develop and 
train reliable methods of building quick trust. 
Develop certifications of trustworthiness (e.g., 
demonstrable proof of competency) to accelerate 
development of trust between organizations that 
have the potential to collaborate.  Some 
technology solutions may be required. 
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 3) Co-location is a strong 
factor in effective 
collaboration and 
cooperation. 
Carefully weigh the economy of distributed or 
virtual teams against the value of personal trust 
relationships and insights gained through co-
location of personnel. Where liaison 
requirements can be anticipated, arrangements 
should begin early enough to find the fit between 
the position, the organization, and the 
environment or problem being worked. Where 
they can’t be anticipated, ensure that processes 
(e.g., training) and infrastructure (e.g., facilities) 
are in place to create them rapidly. 
 4) Collaborating through a 
third organization 
anonymizes exchanges of 
sensitive information. 
Consider establishing third party intermediaries 
or information infrastructure to move 
information when (1) sources and methods must 
be concealed (2) and findings must be rapidly 
communicated between organizations that do not 
have interoperable information systems (e.g., 
common access to SIPRNet or IntelLink). 
 5) Current information 
systems support efficient, 
though inflexible, distributed 
collaboration.  
In assessing value of proposed information 
systems, evaluate the utility to the enterprise and 
to each of its members. Ensure that relatively 
inflexible systems (e.g., highly structured 
databases) return sufficient value to users given 
the cost of using them. Make flexibility a design 
criterion for information systems; discourage 
“stovepipe” systems. 
 6) Structures that link 
partners consist of 
substructures that are 
sometimes antagonistic or 
incongruent. 
Assess the compatibility of partners – their 
history, goals, processes, and culture – before 
investing heavily in developing partnerships. 
Invest in monitoring and managing potential 
incompatibilities.  
 7) Effective inter-agency 
relations are built on 
exchanges of valued assets.  
Develop and exercise capability to assess the 
value of assets each party brings to a 
relationship. Make trade of these assets an 
explicit goal of partnership agreements.   
Processes 8) Information exchange 
costs can encumber 
collaboration.  
Assess the costs of exchanging information (e.g., 
delay or information loss due to declassification) 
and other assets. Manage these costs and partner 
perceptions of them.  
 9) Intra and/or Inter-
organizational partnerships 
can grow from opportunity or 
mandate (bottom-up or top-
down).  
Formalize methods of identifying and growing 
partnerships from the bottom up, and the top 
down. Ensure that these methods are in place 
and function for time critical and unanticipated 
configurations.  
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 10) Organizations 
institutionalize personal trust 
relationships.  
Manage personal trust relationships as an 
enterprise asset by identifying them and 
developing them selectively into enduring 
structural entities. Define working styles and 
processes that enable lower the amount of 
interpersonal interaction required to build or 
verify trust in emergent organization 
relationships. 
 11) Organizations seek to 
learn the capabilities and 
constraints of others, and 
educate others about their 
own capabilities.  
Develop systematic methods of evaluating 
potential partners, and of representing your own 
organization’s capabilities to support others in 
unique or time critical situations. 
 12) Organizations require 
procedures for triggering and 
managing collaboration. 
When planning missions of significant 
complexity and missions in new domains, 
systematically assess the utility and 
manageability of collaboration. In preparation 
for emergent, unforeseen missions, develop 
mechanisms that accelerate this assessment or 
obviate the need for it.  
Culture 14) Historical enmity 
between groups can foul 
interoperability 
Identify areas of historic conflict between 
potential partners. Monitor and manage 
problems that arise from these seemingly 
irrelevant sources. 
 15) National cultures differ 
regarding the importance of 
rank.  
When staffing meetings that cross cultures, 
attend to partners’ requirements for 
showing/seeing authority and technical 
expertise. 
Policy 16) Policies affecting 
information flows between 
organizations or across 
secure domains differ, and 
often conflict, between 
military and law enforcement 
entities.  
Ensure that partners make information sharing 
constraints and mechanisms explicit. 
 17) Organizations differ on 
how proactive they are about 
refining policies.  
Define channels and methods for pushing critical 
policy revisions upward. 
Information 
systems 
18) Information can be 
classified unintentionally; the 
cost of declassification to 
support collaboration can be 
high.   
Identify information critical to collaboration that 
may be unintentionally compartmentalized. 
Ensure alternative access routes to this 
information. 
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 19) Delivery of systems that 
local users cannot support 
(“drive by fielding”) 
diminishes return on 
technology investments.  
Provide transitional support and utility 
assessment with the delivery of new 
technologies. 
 20) Communities of interest 
can help unify users and 
standardize use.  
Establish communities of interest around 
technologies and practices that deliver high 
value information. 
 21) Information quality must 
be assured for user 
confidence.  
Ensure that partnering organizations understand 
which information elements are least reliable. 
Develop procedures for testing and verifying this 
information. 
 22) Information systems and 
systematic information 
handling create value and 
advertise expertise.  
Proceduralize information handling and structure 
information products where it is feasible, 
productive, and affordable to do so. Advertise 
and share those products, invite critiques to 
increase product value. 
 23) Information systems have 
hidden dependencies that can 
foil collaboration. 
Ensure that users and their systems satisfy the 
requirements for using new systems on critical 
tasks.  
 
Objectives for HI09 research 
The goal of the Human Interoperability initiative is to develop knowledge and methods that 
improve the responsiveness, efficiency, and effectiveness of organizations that partner or 
dynamically integrate their own units. The implications of HI08, reported above, provide some 
insight into the guidance that HI research can offer. They must, however, be extended, deepened, 
and developed into a body of knowledge that can be taught, executed by organizational leaders 
and membership, implemented in organizational process architectures, incorporated into decision 
aids, and converted into measures that support monitoring of organizational state and effects.  
 
Much of what we have learned in HI 08 has resolved into several themes:  
 
○ Organizations must build on historical experiences to improve human interoperability in 
collaborations they can foresee; 
○ Organizations must develop mechanisms that allow them to partner rapidly and 
effectively under conditions that cannot be foreseen, because these are inevitable; 
○ Organizations must develop the self-awareness to assess their capability and performance 
in both of these possible states. 
 
 
To address these themes requires research that defines (1) useful organizational structures and 
controls used in the past, (2) human dimensions that enable organizations to adapt creatively to 
unforeseen future states, and (3) technical means that may serve as proxies for the time-tested but 
time-consuming human interactions on which successful interactions are historically based.  
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We recommend a program of research concerning Human Interoperability, one that explores the 
challenges and solutions to Human Interoperability. It is fundamental to such research that we 
specify its objectives in detail. We do so, below, by presenting objectives and research questions 
related to each of the dimensions of the draft theory (see page 2, “Toward a theory of Human I”): 
organizational structures, adaptive competency, structure, policy, procedures, culture, cognitive 
competency, and data interoperability. 
 
• Adaptive competencies 
o Objective: Identify the adaptive competencies of organizations 
o Research questions: 
 How do organizations perceive triggers or cues to change structure, 
processes and control mechanisms? 
 How do organizations select partners? 
 How do organizations capture and test knowledge about the capabilities of 
partner organizations? How and when do they communicate their own 
capabilities? 
 What is the variety of experiences that enable adaptation? 
 How do organizations select or generate feasible structures and controls 
and under what conditions? 
 How do organizations anticipate or react to direct and indirect effects of 
adaptation? 
• Structure 
o Objectives: Assess structural barriers to inter-organization collaboration and 
mechanisms for overcoming them 
o Research questions: 
 What structures do organizations have in place that support collaboration 
with other organizations?  
 What structures do organizations create for collaboration? How elastic are 
organizations to new structural forms? What influences this flexibility? 
 What are the evolutionary patterns of structural change (e.g., from 
personal relationships to working groups)? 
 What is the effect on intra- and inter-organization collaboration when 
antagonists enter the membership network? 
• Policy 
o Objective: Identify policy barriers to inter-organization collaboration and 
mechanisms for overcoming them 
o Research questions: 
 Are members of organizations able to identify policy barriers, violations 
of policy, and new policy requirements? 
 Is the organization able to modify or work around policy barriers when 
needed? 
• Process 
o Objectives: Assess procedural barriers to inter-organization collaboration and 
mechanisms for overcoming them 
o Research questions: 
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 How do organizations specify who coordinates with whom, when, how, 
and based on what information or circumstances? Are those procedures 
known in the organization? 
 What is the valued information or capability that is exchanged between 
organizations? What are the benefits and costs of exchanging information? 
 Do organizations have mechanisms to identify and institutionalize 
personal relationships? 
• Culture 
o Objectives: Identify barriers at the cultural interface between organizations 
o Research questions 
 Does the effectiveness of partnerships vary with differences in power 
distance, individualism, uncertainty handling, short- vs. long-term 
perspective and other factors?  
 How do organizations resolve or manage cultural conflicts? 
• Cognition 
o Objective: Identify the barriers to individual ability to identify, form, and 
implement collaborations and specify the knowledge, skills, and attitudes required 
to overcome these barriers. 
o Research questions:  
 What competencies enable individuals to lead inter- and intra-
organizational partnerships? 
 What competencies enable individuals to participate fully in partnerships? 
• Data interoperability 
o Objectives: Assess barriers to collaboration at the information interface and 
mechanisms for overcoming them 
o Research questions 
 How do organizations balance and rebalance the requirements to protect 
and to disseminate sensitive but valued information? 
 Do technology users have staff, mission-relevant training, resources and a 
community of interest to support use and maintenance of new technology? 
 What methods of information quality assurance are used to test and 
communicate the validity of data? 
Methods of HI09 research 
Research planning specifies measures, materials, venues, and procedures. NPS has refined 
techniques for this through its leadership of analysis activities in all Trident Warrior experiments. 
In brief, this technique involves the following steps: 
○ Measures are defined that explore and test the potential answers to each research 
question. Measurement instruments are developed for use in research studies. 
○ Venues are identified in which research can be conducted. These include field sites at 
which observation and interviews can be conducted, tabletop exercises in which 
organizational leaders demonstrate the process and outcomes of decision making, 
laboratory experiments in which alternative tools and treatments are contrasted, and 
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military experiments8 that exercise operational personnel and technology on 
representative missions. 
○ Scenarios and scenario threads are defined for selected venues. These scenarios specify 
opportunities to apply measures. 
○ Procedures are defined to train research teams (e.g., concerning when and where to use 
measurement instruments); train research participants in technologies, procedures, 
structures, and missions they will use; install technologies required for the study; 
schedule and synchronize events; analyze data; and generate reports.  
 
These activities are executed synchronously in meetings, and asynchronously using collaboration 
technology, such as the NPS website called FIRE: FORCEnet Innovation & Research Enterprise. 
That site provides collaboration functions: email, voicemail, calendar, task lists, discussion 
forums, web conferencing, fileshare, and administrative controls. Critically, many of the 
products of activities executed live and through the workspace are stored in a database – 
accessible to the entire team of researchers and stakeholders – that relates objectives, measures, 
scenarios, venues, and procedures. This highly structured method of developing and 
disseminating product significantly improves management of experiments, and accelerates 
analysis and reporting.  
 
A number of more detailed ideas concerning future experiments are presented in Appendix E: 
Notes Towards Experimentation. 
Conclusion  
This document reports a framework for understanding the Human Interoperability, data 
concerning Human Interoperability at Trident Warrior 2008, implications of those findings, and 
objectives for future research. That research must refine HI theory, report findings from 
systematically designed studies using quantitative measures, and develop products – case studies, 
guidelines, and diagnostic and predictive models – that help organizations grow their capabilities 
to interface at the human level with their current and future partners.  
 
                                                 
8 We remind the reader that experiments conducted by DoD differ from the controlled, laboratory events conducted 
in science and engineering communities. DoD experiments often inject a new technology or process into an existing 
organization or operational system. No control conditions are established. The effects of the manipulation are 
generally assessed by subject matter experts and by participants who have substantial personal experience with 
standard technologies or processes. Further, DoD experiments serve several functions above and beyond the 
discovery of effects. These events: 
• Advertise new technologies and procedures to participants 
• Test the interoperability of technologies 
• Test training for these technologies and procedures 
• Produce nominal plans for executing the tested mission, as well as new tactics, techniques, and procedures 
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Appendix A: Literature Review  
 
Several bodies of literature bear on the phenomena we call the Human Interoperability: (1) 
theoretical and empirical research by industrial / organizational psychologists concerning team 
effectiveness, (2) design and testing techniques of systems engineers (3) and cross-cultural 
studies. None of these literatures satisfactorily inform the analysis, design, development, and 
testing of the human interface between organizations. So that the reader can draw their own 
conclusions regarding this claim, we provide an overview of this literature, below.  
Psychology of Team Effectiveness 
Industrial / organizational psychologists have developed a diverse body of theory to explain how 
the competencies and behaviors of team members influence the effectiveness of teams. This 
work is characterized by: 
• A focus on team members, rather than the environment in which they work 
• A focus on interactions within teams, rather than between 
• No assumptions that the activities of teams are well-defined or ill-defined 
• A large number of abstract constructs (e.g., leadership) that are experimentally 
operationalized in a variety of ways, rather than a limited number of relatively concrete 
factors 
• Research methods that apply surveys of team members or observers in operational or 
training settings, rather than laboratory methods  
 
The flavor of this literature is evident in a few, representative theories selected a brief survey of 
this literature. (For a more extensive review, see Salas, Stagl, and Burke, 2004.) 
 
Salas, Sims, and Burke (2005) drew on a broad body of theory and research (Salas, Stagl, and 
Burke, 2004) to define a “Big Five” factors in teamwork9:  
• Team leadership 
• Mutual performance monitoring 
• Backup behavior 
• Adaptability 
• Team orientation, an attitude favoring interdependence and interaction 
 
They identified several mechanisms by which teams coordinate to apply these five capabilities 
well: 
• Shared mental models  
• Mutual trust  
• Closed-loop communication  
 
Prior work by McIntyre and Salas (1995) touched on these factors and others in a review of 
survey research conducted on military teams that execute naval gunfire support, antisubmarine 
                                                 
9 The phrasing is a play by Salas, Sims, and Burke (2005) on the Big Five personality factors: neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness (or intellect), agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Thurstone, 1934). 
 29
warfare, and guided missile operations. The authors specified 20 principles that touched on four 
of the “Big Five” factors (excluding adaptability), as well as: 
• Feedback between team members 
• Taskwork skills of individual team members  
• Context-driven selection of skills and styles (e.g., authoritarian vs. interactive style) from 
a large repertoire 
• Evolution of skills over time 
 
In a broader review, Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, and Volpe (1994) organized what 
they termed the “confused and contradictory” literature on team skills into eight factors, several 
of them familiar from the lists, above: 
• Adaptability of teamwork strategies to the environment  
• Shared situational awareness 
• Performance monitoring and feedback 
• Leadership and team management 
• Interpersonal relations to optimize cooperation  
• Coordination of team activities 
• Communication 
• Decision making 
 
There is, then, some consensus concerning factors and behaviors between individuals that enable 
teams to be effective. It is not clear, however, what role these factors play as teams and 
organizations build alliances with others.  
 
In related work, personality researchers have developed a small but growing body of evidence 
that individual personality characteristics – not just individual taskwork proficiency (Stewart, 
2006) – influence team performance (Van Scotter and Motowidlo, 1996; Day and Silverman, 
1989; Organ and Ryan, 1995; Hogan, Rybicki, Motowidlo, S., and Borman, 1998). Because 
personality characteristics are not highly malleable, this literature has more utility with respect to 
the selection of team members than their training or management. However, it is not entirely 
clear how much variance personality characteristics account for given other team-level variables 
(above). 
 
Systems Engineering Approaches to Team Design 
The systems engineering community has developed methods of representing teams, in efforts to 
design organizations or the systems they command and operate. This work implicitly defines a 
theory of human interoperability, because it specifies the environment in which people operate. 
The characteristics of this work in large part contrast with those of team effectiveness research. 
In the design literature, one finds:  
• A focus on the environment in which teams function, rather than on the team members 
• A focus on phenomena between organizational entities (typically teams), rather than on 
activity with those entities 
• An assumption that the activities of teams are well-defined, and thus, that they can be 
formally represented and modeled  
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• A small number of relatively concrete constructs (entities, resources, tasks) , rather than a 
large number of abstract factors 
• Research that, though scant, employs mainly laboratory methods, rather than survey 
techniques in operational settings  
 
A few examples represent this field well. 
 
The DoD Architecture Framework (Department of Defense, 2007) specifies methods of 
representing the operational aspects of a system (“OV” diagrams of its function, connectivity, 
information dependencies, roles and relationships, activities, and states), technical aspects of 
system entities (“SV” diagrams of entity interfaces, functions, activities, performance 
parameters, technologies, information formats, and others), and standards employed by the 
system (“TV” diagrams). 
 
A small, more diverse, and largely academic community of engineers has defined other methods 
of representing and computationally modeling the activity of organizations. This work applies 
multi-objective optimization techniques (Levchuk, Chopra, Levchuk, and Paley, 2005)), 
simulated annealing (Carley and Svoboda, 1996), discrete event simulation (Barnes and 
Laughery, 1997), network analytic methods (Levchuk and Chopra, 2005) and other techniques 
(Levitt, 2004) to design, test, or infer the command and control relationships among 
organizational entities (their structure) and the precedence of tasks (their process). These models 
represent a variety of factors, typically some subset of: 
• Mission / Process – defined as a task precedence graph 
• Events – defined as cues to task  
• Tasks – characterized by the resources required to execute them 
• Assets / Resource – the capabilities of materiel entities to perform tasks 
• Role / Decision maker – the capabilities of human entities to perform tasks 
• Organization – the command, control, and communication structures that constrain 
authority over people, asset allocation, and information exchange 
 
Integration of Psychological and Engineering Approaches 
A recent body of work combines the I/O and systems engineering approaches to understanding 
and designing effective human organizations.  
 
Research by Ilgen and Holloway (Moon, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, West, Ellis, Humphrey, Porter, 
2000) uses experimental methods and statistical modeling techniques characteristic of the social 
sciences to explore the behavior of organizations that are structured in ways that systems 
engineers would readily recognize. Their work has discovered surprising effects, such as an 
asymmetry in structural adaptation by which teams more readily shift their structure from 
functional (in which each member controls a unique type of assets, e.g., aircraft) to divisional (in 
which each member controls all types of assets in a given geographical region) than from 
divisional to functional, which the mission conditions demand structural adaptation.  
 
Orvis and colleagues (Orvis and Zaccaro, 2007; McCormack, Ducchon, Geyer, and Orvis, in 
press) have addressed to problem of composing effective teams by representing factors from the 
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I/O tradition and the systems engineering paradigm in a single model. This approach is intended 
to specify teams whose members possess the competencies to perform well-specified tasks, are 
available to perform those tasks, and have the leadership and followership (team skills) 
competencies to collaborate well with teammates. 
 
Skarin (personal communication, 25 September 2008) is approaching the problem of team 
composition by modeling the knowledge and knowledge requirements of team members. 
Statistical language processing techniques are used to infer the knowledge of members of an 
organization from the content of documents they read and write. The relationships among those 
individuals are mapped as social networks from data concerning email correspondence, phone 
calls, and physical proximity (using RFID badges). These data are sufficient to make inferences 
concerning which individuals currently outside a team might bring needed knowledge into that 
team.  
Cross-Cultural Studies 
Researchers of culture vary in their methods from the largely exploratory methods of 
anthropology, which are designed to enable relevant social constructs to emerge through 
observation and participation, to more formal schools that employ survey methods identify 
constructs or dimensions that reliably distinguish one culture from another. We focus here on the 
more formal school, whose work is characterized by:   
• A focus on the society or culture, rather than on individuals, teams, or their environment 
• A focus on reliable differences in the character of each culture, rather than on interactions 
between organizations or individuals 
• No representation of tasks, and thus no assumptions that they are well-defined or ill-
defined 
• A modest number of relatively abstract constructs (e.g., authority relationships) , rather 
than a large number of abstract factors 
• Research using surveys whose items often are not grounded (or constrained by) specific 
context or missions, and thus may lack validity. 
 
The current touchstone in this field is Hofstede’s (2004) five dimensional cultural model, in 
which cultures are characterized in terms of power distance, which reflects the degree of equality 
or inequality among the population; individualism vs. collectivism, the degree to which 
individual or collective achievements are rewarded; masculinity vs. femininity, the degree to 
which men and women within a culture differ in their respective roles; uncertainty avoidance, 
which reflects how well individuals handle unexpected and ambiguous situations; and time 
orientation, the degree that a culture does or does not embrace a long-term perspective and a 
respect for traditions. The scores of each nation on the Hofstede dimensions are represented in 




Figure 5: Map of national scores on Hofstede’s five cultural dimensions 
Note: Darker shading indicates higher scores. Blank areas indicate missing data. This map was 
generated using the ManyEyes web service10 using a data set published by Hoftstede11. 
 
Related work by Nisbett, 2003) and others has introduced the importance of honor, or the degree 
to which society sanctions the use of violence as a justifiable tactic for resolving affronts to one’s 
character. Under Hofstede’s, Arab culture is characterized by high power distance (meaning 
wide disparities of equality among social classes and great deference to status individuals), and 
high uncertainty avoidance (in which daily interactions are governed by societal rules that lower 
uncertainty).  Beaubien, Knott, Orvis, and Freeman (2008) developed descriptions of situations 
that tested the standing of respondents on most of the dimensions, above, and found that unique 
linear combinations of these dimensions reliably predicted the responsiveness of members of one 
Asian culture to strategies typically used in advertising and psychological operations12.  
 
Traditional demographics analyses are often used to profile cultures for purposes as diverse as 
market analysis, political forecasting, and psychological operations, in which decisions concern 
what style of communications – rational explanations, visionary statements, testimonials, etc. – 
will most effectively convey a message. Demographic analysis typically considers data 
concerning income, age, sex, working status, language, position in the household (father, 
daughter, etc.), marital status, and religion. These variables more or less reliably predict 
purchasing behaviors, voting, and other behaviors. Note, however, that demographic methods are 
typically within a culture, rather than between cultures. It is not entirely clear whether traditional 
demographics reliably predict institutional behaviors or define its culture.  
                                                 
10 ManyEyes is available at: http://services.alphaworks.ibm.com/manyeyes/view/SLinXQsOtha6b6FrBV6bQ2~ 
11 The Hofstede data set is published by the author at: http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php 
12 The goal of PSYOP is to always tell the truth, as evidenced by the motto of COL James Treadwell, Commander of 
the 4th Psychological Operations Group: “The truth is the best propaganda.” This strategy helps ensure the 
credibility of influence campaigns (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2003). 
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Appendix B: Trident Warrior Technologies in HI08.1 
Two collaboration technologies were explored in the part of TW08 focused on law enforcement 
(HI08.1). These technologies were the Law Enforcement Information Exchange (LInX) and the 
Force Protection Portal (FPP). 
• LInX is a database of law enforcement records from several participating regions of the 
United States. LInX presents the user with access to pawn shop data; a rapid, tactical 
search capability typically used by police during arrests; an analytic search capability that 
provides Boolean search, search of free text (narrative) fields, and link analysis; a 
personalized home page; and system administration functions. A search on LInX can 
return a suspect’s name, date of birth, aliases, criminal incidents, role in those incidents 
(witness, cited), vehicles involved, weapons involved, incident type, a narrative (e.g., 
pocket litter), photo, warrant information, contact information for the suspect, and contact 
information for the issuing law enforcement agency. Link analysis reports graphically 
represent the relationships between many of these entities (e.g., suspects to addresses to 
vehicles). The quality of these reports varies somewhat due to uncorrelated data (e.g., 
separate records for John Hartwick, John J. Hartwick, and Johnny Hartwik may concern 
the same person), spurious correlations (by which innocent individuals are coincidentally 
associated with suspects). The utility of the reports is in part a function of their volume; a 
search against the current one million records can return a very large number of hits. 
Users generally may not use LInX records as the basis for warrants or arrests, but must 
contact the issuing agency for the source data. LInX legal records may not be transferred 
to the military. These and other policies are currently being standardized across the LInX 
user community. In this exercise, LInX was populated with actual, but anonymized 
criminal records. 
• FPP is an unclassified, password protected internet portal that provides file sharing, chat, 
email. FPP presents users with access to news, upcoming events, a document repository, 
sites of interest (DHS, Department of State, CNN, etc.), and the NCIS portal. The latter 
provides email, a document repository, chat, a calendar, and current briefings. NCIS 
participants and observers in TW08 exercised the FPP portal to access documents 
concerning scenario events, and to communicate with each other and the controller. All 
users had access to all documents on the portal. (In actual use, there may be legal or 
regional policy constraints on information access and dissemination). FPP is designed for 
operational use, and not for experimentation. Thus, it does not support observers with 
features such as email logging.  
The scenarios that exercised LInX and FPP in this part of Trident Warrior consisted of base 
materials and a four-day stream of injects that required participants to detect several threats: 
Scenario 1a: A planned anthrax attack against Oahu 
Scenario 1b: A planned anthrax attack against Seattle 
 Scenario 2: A planned radiological attack against a Hawaiian sonar range 
Participants in this element of Trident Warrior field offices of the Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service (NCIS) in Bahrain, Dubai, Hawaii, Japan, Seattle and Singapore; the Joint Terrorism 
Task Force, Third Fleet MOC, the British Royal Navy, and the New Zealand Navy. In addition, 
data were collected in an observation of a VTC between several of these organizations and the 
Multiple Threats Alert Center.  
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Appendix C: HI08 Data 
 
Data collected at HI08 are available in sanitized form (i.e., without personally identifying 
information) with the permission of OSD NII. For further information, please contact Jared 




Appendix D: Controller communications in HI08.1 
 
In addition to the interviews reported in the body of this report, we examined a sample of email 
between participants and the controller13 in HI08.1 in order to understand the level of 
participation and the types of interaction between participants and experiment organizers. We 
found several classes of communication: 
 
• Technical support communications provided users with instructions about where to put 
files, how to use the systems, how to handle different file formats, and so forth.  
• Logistical communications concerned coordination between controllers, how to reach 
controllers, etc. 
• Scenario event communications provided new injects, copies of injects, background 
information, responses to requests for information (e.g., summaries of requested (but 
unavailable) reports), responses to participants’ planned actions (e.g., “When you call the 
Bahraini Minister of the Interior, you will learn that…”), and corrections of participant 
misunderstandings. 
• Participant activity reports documented what participants had done and what they 
planned to do within or outside the artificial confines of the scenario. Only one 
participant in the sample of ~30 emails provided detailed accounts of these activities. 
 
                                                 
13 No email between participants was available for analysis.   
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Appendix E: Notes Towards Experimentation 
 
Experiment Themes 
Several specific themes for HI09 experimentation arose in discussions among members of the 
research team:  
• Optimizing Human Interoperability Performance in Law Enforcement Enterprises which 
Leverage Investigative Data Sharing Systems (e.g., LInX) 
• The Role and Contribution of HI in the Developing, Establishing and Advancing 
Common Operating Pictures 
• Aligning Distinct Different Organization Cultures through HI Principles, Standards and 
Practices for Improved Enterprise Performance, Study One: The Military and Embedded 
and External Law Enforcement (this could be the first in a series, which could go on and 
on) 
• The Contribution of HI to Senior Policy Formulation and Decision Making (contact Neil 
Palmer, UK MOD) 
• Agency Ideology and Culture and Its Influences on Establishing and Maintaining Peer 
External Organizational and Individual Relationships (JTTF as one experimental 
environment) 
• Trust, Relationships and Enterprise Effectiveness in Multiagency Constructs (established 
as in JTTFs for law enforcement, or task forces—various military- non-military 
constructs; hastily formed and established or mandated and forming) 
• Influence of Personnel and Career Practices on Enterprise Performance in Agencies 
Dependent on Specialized Relationships, Experience and Expertise 
• Role of Relationships in DOD-Non-DOD Engagements: The NCAG Model (can identify 
others for study too to broaden the effort) 
• Comparison of International and USN NCAG Operations: The HI Component 
• HI in Crisis and Non-Crisis Environments, Strategic, Operational and Tactical 
Considerations In Established and Hastily Formed Multiagency Constructs 
 
Experimental Participants 
HI08.1 successfully engaged military law enforcement.  HI09 should engage civilian entities, as 
well.  
 
Recommendation: An NCIS analyst s recommended that future experiments engage a major 
police department with command-and-control capabilities such as the NYPD, DHS entities such 
as the FBI, and European law enforcement entities such as EUROPOL. 
 
Experimental Materials & Process 
A data collection instrument was defined to elicit, in interviews and observations, data 
concerning policy barriers, inter- and intra-organizational processes and structure, and other 
matters. The draft instrument is in Appendix F: Data Collection Instruments 
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Recommendation: Review, revise, and use the draft data collection instrument in HI09.  
 
The analysis of controller-participant communications identified several classes of 
communications for which controllers might prepare in advance of the experiment.  
 
Recommendation: To prepare for their technical support role, controllers should conduct at 
least one pilot study to identify the types of technical support questions that may arise and the 
types of workarounds that may be needed.  
 
Recommendation: To prepare for their technical support role, controllers should conduct one 
tabletop exercise using the experimental materials to determine what information or documents 
participants may request from whom, how to structure fileshares, how to conduct chats (e.g., 
how to schedule them across time zones), and so forth.  
 
Recommendation: White cell and controllers should map out the potential network of contacts 
with whom participants might try to communicate during the scenario, specify the questions that 
might be asked, and sketch out provisional answers to deliver in response. 
 
Recommendation: If it is not possible to monitor participant activity, controllers should 
encourage participants to document the activities they did execute (e.g., “Issued RFI 
concerning…”) and those they plan to execute (e.g., “Will call the Bahrain Ministry of the 
Interior to ask…”). 
 
Experimental Venue  
A fundamental concern in inter-agency experiments is where participants should be as they 
execute the experiment.  
 
Participants who convene at a central site lose access to some of the human and material 
resources on which they depend, but they are at less risk of distraction, they have the technical 
support they may need to use experimental technologies effectively, and they are readily 
accessible to observers.  
 
Participants working from their own workplaces have access to the human, technical, and 
document resources that enable them to respond to scenario events in a natural way. However, 
they are inevitably distracted by real-world tasking, they may have difficulty using new 
technologies or procedures being studied in the experiment, and it can be more difficult to 
observe their behaviors or elicit their opinions.  
 
Distributed participants are inevitable in any richly defined inter-agency experiment. Methods 
are needed to engage distributed participants more fully in the experiment.  
 
Recommendation: Place a trusted agent working at each, distributed site to win fuller 
engagement from participants there.  
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Recommendation: Engage distributed participants in pre-experiment planning, in-experiment 
hot washes, and post-experiment lessons learned events to develop a community of interest and 
raise their level of involvement in the experiment. In these sessions, emphasize the institutional 
value of the experiment (e.g., fulfilling an official requirement), and the professional benefits to 
participants: learning new technologies, building relationships with others in the field, fulfilling 
goals for performance review, or intellectual challenge.  
 
Organizational Structures 
A variety of organizational structures for HI were identified in HI08.1.  
 
Recommendation: HI09 should sample the variety of structures used to build HI: co-location of 




Law enforcement and military organizations exhibited important cultural differences in 
HI2008.1. The next HI should exploit such differences. 
 
Recommendation: HI09 should assess the cultural attributes of participating organizations 
(e.g., using Hofstede’s (1980) framework) and should design scenarios that exploit natural 
interactions between entities with conflicting cultures.  
 
Organizational Process 
Law enforcement and the military differ in the processes they employ for developing 
relationships between entities.  
 
Recommendation: HI09 should assess the formality and effectiveness of procedures for 
institutionalizing productive relationships between entities.  
 
Information systems 
Observers of HI08.1 saw successful use of LInX for searches of law enforcement data, and FPP 
for relaying scenario injects and communication with the experiment controller. Lessons learned 
concerning the FPP are particularly relevant to future experiments, which will use collaboration 
technologies. In general, these technologies or technologies (“wrappers”) that incorporate them 
should provide services for experiment observers, not just participants. 
  
Recommendation: Ensure that portal-based email systems copy every email between 
participants so that these messages are also delivered to controllers and observers. Ideally, 
participant email addresses will include their locations and/or roles. 
 
Recommendation: Ensure that chat systems log all communications for inspection by observers.  
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Recommendation: Ensure that file sharing system log file activity for analysis (e.g., to determine 
who did and did not read or write key files). It may be useful to push these logs like RSS feeds to 
observers and controllers.  
 
Recommendation: Ensure that phone systems records voice communications and metadata, 
minimally participant identities, date, time, and call duration for each participant for each call 
(point-to-point or teleconference). Providing VOIP telephone capability through portals may 
facilitate this.   
 
Several minor technical glitches conveyed useful lessons.  
 
Recommendation: Ensure that participants have access to the infrastructure required to use new 
technology: unclassified network ports, utilities for opening required files (e.g., .pdf’s), etc.  
 
Providing the human infrastructure for new technologies is an important aspect of technology 
insertion. 
 
Recommendation: Technology evaluations should assess the staffing requirements of new tools, 
the utility of training for performing locally critical tasks, and the plans for communities of 
interest to govern the use of new technology. 
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Appendix F: Data Collection Instruments 
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Human Interoperability 2008 
 
Data collector:                                                 Date/Time: 
 
Observed Organization / 
Participant Role(s) / Location 
 
Vignette / Event:                                                            
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Instructions to HI08 Data Collectors 
 
Please read the instructions for researchers to familiarize yourself with the objectives of 
the HI experiment objectives. 
 
Please use the Briefing to Participants if you must provide a brief. 
 
Collect data at major scenario events using the questionnaire, log, and other forms.  
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Data collector:                                                 Date/Time: 
 
Observed Organization / 
Participant Role(s) / Location 
 




Overview for HI08 Data Collectors 
  
HI08 is an experiment designed to evaluate human interoperability in a complex 
environment – an inter-agency maritime security experiment by assessing 
• Policies concerning information sharing 
• Processes & structures within agencies that support collaboration 
• Processes & structures between agencies that implement collaboration (e.g., 
cross-briefings, working groups) 

















for HIE  
Figure 6: HI08 explores the policies, procedures, and structures (in italics) that enable HI. 
 
The products of this experiment and future work will be: 
• A process for planning and conducting HI09 
• Gaps and opportunities for enhancing collaboration and coordination. 
• New organizational structures and processes that enable disparate organizations to 
collaborate across legacy shared or ad-hoc boundaries 
• Reliable methods for measuring and managing human interoperability in 
organizations 
 
HI08 takes place 16-27 June 2008 at various locations as part of Trident Warrior 2008.  
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Participating data collectors in this experiment are: 
 
Person Date Task Email Cell 
Tami 
Smith 



























Hal Moore 23-27 HI white cell hal.moore@northcom.mil (719) 554-
8045  






















The instruments below are designed for use by the data collectors. Please print several 
copies and take notes on these forms, or take notes as you wish while keying the answers 
to the question numbers listed below. Please administer these forms at every significant 
experimental event or scenario as defined in the TW08 schedule. Amend the forms with 
new items as you see fit. Please write neatly or transcribe your notes to electronic form. 
Keep all notes unclassified. 
 
Return all materials to Jared by 1 July 2008. He will send Fed Ex to you upon request. 
Contact Jared at: freeman@aptima.com; office: 202-842-1548, x316; cell: 202-262-3030; 
fax: 202-842-2630; Aptima, 1726 M Street, NW, #900, Washington, DC 20036.   
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Form #1: Briefing to Participants 
 
The Office of Secretary of Defense is sponsoring an experiment to examine how 
organizations interact over Maritime Domain Awareness events.  We call this experiment 
Human Interoperability 2008. This experiment “piggybacks” on Trident Warrior 2008, 
which you are participating now.  
 
We are not assessing your performance in HI08. We are not assessing the performance of 
your organization. We are studying the interface between organizations, specifically within 
DoD and between DoD and DoJ, DHS and the Intel Community.  
 
OSD will issue a report from this experiment that draws some initial lessons and specifies 
the design of a larger HI experiment in 2009. Future products of HI will help organizations 
to design their policies, processes, protocols, organizational structures, standards and 
technologies in ways that make MDA and other complex organizational enterprise 
responses more effective, efficient, timely and responsive. 
 
This is the support we need from you: 
• During parts of TW08: 
o A data collector will sit with you to observe and ask you questions.  
o We’ll request your job title and organization. (We don’t need your name). 
o We'll observe your response to events in TW08, and we will interview you 
concerning these events. 
• Please be prepared to introduce the data collector to other knowledgeable,  
appropriately placed experts in your organization. We'd like to gather their thoughts 
about the type of events, processes and opportunities for improvements to human 
systems performance that will be encountered in this exercise. 
• Please play by the rules of TW08. Our presence is not meant to change your 
mission or actions in TW08.  
 
Do you have any questions? 
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Form #2: Participant Demographics 
 
Instructions 
For each participant observed or interviewed, gather the information below. Develop and 
document new questions as you see fit.   
 
Demographics 
2.1 Operator TW08 PIN # (4 digits chosen by operator) 
 
2.2 First letter of Operator’s last name:   
 
2.3 Rank / Rate 
 
2.4 Organization / Command: 
 
2.5 Position/Role Title:   
 
2.6 Length of Time in Position/Role:   
 




2.8 Length of Time in MDA Missions: 
 












   
Human Interoperability 2008 
 
Data collector:                                                 Date/Time: 
 
Observed Organization / 
Participant Role(s) / Location 
 
Vignette / Event:                                                            
 
 46
Form #3: Interview Questionnaire 
 
Instructions 
For each major event or scenario, ask the participant(s) the Questions (below). Record the 
question numbers and answers in Observer Notes table. Develop and document new 
questions as you see fit.   
 
Questions 
Q# Item Objective 
3.1 How does your organization decide to accept this task or 
respond to an event or message like this? 
Objective v2: Process 
between agencies (Item: 
14.01 Interface: 
process) 
3.2 What is an acceptable range of time (minimum, average, 
and maximum) to respond to an event such as this? 
Objective v2: Process 
between agencies (Item: 
5.01 Interface: n.a.) 
3.3 How do you process this task internally? Who does 
what? 
Objective v2: Process 
between agencies (Item: 
14.02 Interface: 
process) 
3.4 Is there a format or protocol for sharing information 
about this event between agencies? If yes, name it. 
Objective v2: Process 
between agencies (Item: 
1.01 Interface: data) 
3.5 Does the format convey the information that is necessary 
and sufficient for analysis or decision making in your 
(receiving) organization? If no, please comment. 
Objective v2: Process 
between agencies (Item: 
1.02 Interface: data) 
3.6 What interactions with other agencies will you engage in 
to respond to this event? How long can you afford to wait 
(i.e., the maximum) for data or decisions from the other 
agencies? 
Objective v2: Process 
between agencies (Item: 
6.02 Interface: process) 
3.7 Are interagency teams/collaborations defined before the 
event? If yes, name them. 
Objective v2: Process 
between agencies (Item: 
1.04 Interface: 
structure) 
3.8 How do you ensure that responses or tasks are ready to 
hand off to other agencies? 
Objective v2: Process 
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Q# Item Objective 
3.9 Is there a named process for sharing information 
about this event between agencies (e.g., a 
protocol, meeting, COP)? If yes, name it. 
Objective v2: Process between 
agencies (Item: 1.03 Interface: 
process) 
3.11 Are there policies that enable interaction 
between agencies in this event? What are they? 
Objective v2: Process between 
agencies (Item: 9.01 Interface: 
policy) 
3.12 What interactions in this event are not governed 
by policy? 
Objective v2: Process between 
agencies (Item: 10.01 Interface: 
policy) 
3.13 Are these policies ever suspended to facilitate 
interagency interaction? Under what conditions? 
Objective v2: Process between 
agencies (Item: 11.01 Interface: 
policy) 
3.14 Do the policies of other agencies conflict with 
these policies? 
Objective v2: Process between 
agencies (Item: 13.01 Interface: 
policy) 
3.15 What inhibits effective performance on this 
event?  
Objective v2: Process between 
agencies (Item: 3.01 Interface: 
policy, structure, process, data, 
culture) 
3.16 Is performance on this event handicapped by the 
structure of your organization: insufficient 
number of staff, missing roles, redundant roles, 
unnecessary roles? 
Objective v2: Process between 
agencies (Item: 3.02 Interface: 
structure) 
3.17 Is performance on this event handicapped by 
missing or awkward processes? 
Objective v2: Process between 
agencies (Item: 3.03 Interface: 
process) 
3.18 Is performance on this task handicapped by 
difficulty getting specific data or information? 
Objective v2: Process between 
agencies (Item: 3.04 Interface: 
data) 
3.19 Is performance on this task handicapped by 
cultural or personality conflicts within or 
between organizations? 
Objective v2: Process between 
agencies (Item: 3.05 Interface: 
culture) 
3.20 Are there policies that inhibit interaction 
between agencies in this event? What are they? 
How? 
Objective v2: Process between 
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Form #4: Observation Log 
 
Instructions 
For each major event or scenario, record significant events pertaining to each of the items 
using the Log and Log Addendum. Develop and document new items as you see fit. 
 
Log 
# Item Objective 
4.1 What data or decisions are received at the beginning of 
this event? What is the format or protocol? In what 















4.3 When did this entity or agency accept responsibility for or 









4.4 What is the name (if any) of the organizational process 
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# Item Objective 









4.6 What data or decisions are requested while processing this 
event? By whom and of whom? What is the format or 


























4.9 When did the agency issue a response or decision 
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Form #5: Workplace Layout 
 
Instructions 
For each physical space in which you observe operations, sketch the configuration and 
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Form #6: Social Network 
 
Instructions 
For each organization you observe, sketch the social network within and between 
organizations in which organizations and roles are nodes, and directed arcs (arrows) are 
relationships. Please label the arcs with terms that characterize the function the 
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Form #7: HI09 Recommendations 
 
Instructions 




7.1 Your ideas for HI09 research objectives 
7.2 Your ideas for HI09 research measures 
7.3 Your ideas for HI09 research participants (organizations)
7.4 Your ideas for HI09 scenario events & materials 
7.5 Your ideas for HI09 research methods 
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